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A History of American Law is an unusual book. For one thing,
it is the first general book on American legal history. For another, it
is serious scholarship that, unlike comparable law review work, man-
ages to be interesting. What Friedman has done is to chronologically
trace major legal movements from colonial times through the 19th
Century. This, in itself, may strike one as the type of massive chore
that frustrated law professors set up for themselves and that sensible
readers stay away from. It is Friedman's scope of interest, tempered
with a judicious use of historical material, which makes this book
valuable reading for anyone interested in the foundations of Ameri-
can law.
When lawyers think of "law," they think of common law. When
they think of legal history, they think of English history. If you press
a lawyer as to why a particular precedent should no longer control,
he might argue that current social policy requires different legal solu-
tions. If you continue to press, he may come up with the history
"behind" the old precedent: statements by courts during that period
concerning the social object they sought to accomplish. Now, why the
legal profession thinks of law as judge-made, of legal history as Eng-
lish, and of American legal history as judicial rationalizations in old
opinions is, I believe, very much a product of American legal educa-
tion. As is apparent from Friedman's discussion on the training of
the legal profession, Langdell's case method was, from its inception
in 1871,1 deferential toward English law, hostile to statutory bnact-
ments, and consciously manipulative when it came to American legal
history. However, whether legal education is responsible for these
jurisprudential notions is not now the point. There can be no doubt
that these attitudes are common in legal circles. A History of Ameri-
can Law, in effect, depicts the gravity of these misconceptions.
Friedman accomplishes this by building a unified historical edif-
ice in which the common law in particular, and the law in general,
are but important elements. For example, it is folly to view the Amer-
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ican Industrial Revolution as a creature of law. Yet, legal develop-
ments, especially legislative ones, did play a significant role. This was
not because legislators had some over-all view that capitalism was to
be encouraged. Rather, legislatures recognized that increased eco-
nomic activity was demonstrably better for the public and sought in
specific ways to facilitate such activity. Friedman captures this mag-
nificiently, from the arousal of need, through enactment, and on to
the economic and social consequences. Areas such as ease of incorpo-
ration, simplification of real property transfers, and use of land
grants to increase commerce are detailed and analyzed.
As the author makes clear, social change of this magnitude is
rarely the subject of universal acclaim and these legislative actions
were inherently schismatic. As soon as a particular endeavor was
sufficiently ensconced so as to take hold, the movement to control it
was spawned. A particularly cogent example was the railroad and the
railroad town. It was the prime goal of many communities to get the
railroad to come their way; in fact, there was much competition in
this regard. However, as soon as the tracks were down and goods
were being shipped, people became resentful of the railroad's power.
After all, the railroad could destroy the town by altering its path and
could do severe damage merely by changing its schedule. Moreover,
neither the townspeople nor anyone they knew had control over the
rates charged by the trains. Viewed in this historical light, it is not
difficult to understand the love-hate relationship which has character-
ized the American attitude toward industrial activity.
Friedman's ability to weave social and legal history and to select
the right examples (and the right number) is no less true in his treat-
ment of common law. The impact of industrialization on tort law
serves as a fine example from the same historical period. Again, one
would think from reading judicial opinions that negligence principles
came directly from England and were extended to Americans in order
to mitigate the rigors of the machine age. In fact, the incorporation
of negligence as a separate action within the law of torts occurred
over 100 years earlier in America than in England.2 And, whatever
one thinks of current personal injury practice, the principle of negli-
2 Just prior to the Civil War, Justice Lemuel Shaw decided that the law of torts consisted
of suits based on negligence and actions for intentional wrongs. Brown v. Kendall, 6 Cush. 292
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gence arose to protect American industrialists from strict liability for
direct harm. Strict liability, after all, was simply unthinkable in an
age in which machines had a remarkable capacity to separate appen-
dages from the stalk of the body. When lawyers, armed with poor and
bloodied clients, evidenced a continuing interest in the company
vault, defenses like the fellow servant rule and assumption of risk
were invented and rigorously applied.3 Still, as with the railroad
town, not all judges, and perhaps, not any one judge, wholly perceived
their function as protecting industrial defendants. "Indeed, the pull
in the opposite direction was always there and grew steadily stronger.
Reaction to the severe rules made itself felt almost as soon as each
doctrine was born."' 4 History is not monolithic.
A review of any work is intrinsically limited and necessarily
episodic. These limitations are especially unfortunate in this case for
one of the book's prime merits is its very comprehensiveness. At the
least, this review should make clear that Friedman's History imparts
an understanding of law that goes far beyond mere doctrine or simpli-
fied historical explanation. It is for this reason that A History of
American Law, which was not written for legal historians, is a genu-
ine historical event.
3 FRIEDMAN, supra n. 1, at 413. Existing doctrine was also expanded to meet the needs
of industrial defendants.
Contributory negligence can be traced, as a doctrine, to an English case decided
in 1809. But it was rarely used before the 1850's. what happened in between was
the rise of the railroads. In 1840, there were less than 3,000 miles of track in the
United States; by 1850, 9,000; by 1860, 30,000; by 1870, 52,000. Personal-injury
cases grew as fast as the trackage. Most cases were crossing accidents. The air brake
was not invented until 1868; and it was not in general use until much later than that.
Before the air brake, trains simply could not quickly slow down. They sped through
the countryside, futilely clanging their bells, and, all too often, colliding with cattle,
other trains, or men (footnotes omitted).
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